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PART I: PRIVATE LAW
TORTS
by
Page Keeton*
I.

IMPUTED CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE

F

REQUENTLY, one who was not negligent is injured by the actionable
negligence of two or more other persons. Normally, the negligent parties
would be joint tortfeasors and each would be liable to the victim for the entire
damage suffered. All states have recognized, however, that situations.exist
where the negligence of one party should be imputed to a non-negligent party
plaintiff because of some relationship between them.' Imputing negligence to
a non-negligent plaintiff in effect makes him contributorily negligent. Since
contributory negligence has until recently been a complete bar to recovery,2
the plaintiff would then be required to look for relief only to the negligent
party who was actually contributorily negligent.3 For example, if a passenger
is injured in a car accident caused by the negligence of his driver and that of
another motorist, the passenger might be barred from suing the motorist and
forced to sue his driver. The legal issue may be framed as follows: when is the
relationship between the claimant and another such that negligence of the
latter should be regarded as though it were the claimant's?
Under the Restatement (Second) of Torts a person's negligence, in general,
is imputed to an innocent victim to bar him from recovery only if the
relationship between the parties is such that the negligence of one party would
have been imputed to a non-negligent party defendant.4 In other words,
contributory negligence is imputed to the plaintiff only when negligence
would have been imputed to him had he been the defendant. This is commonly
referred to as the both-ways doctrine; negligence is imputed for both purposes or for neither purpose. The acceptance of this doctrine presumes that
rules relating to vicarious liability also apply to imputed contributory negligence. Thus limited, the imputed contributory negligence doctrine is of
* B.A., LL.B., University of Texas; S.J.D., Harvard University; LL.D., Southern
Methodist University. W. Page Keeton Professor of Law in Torts, University of Texas.
1. See generally W. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS § 74 (4th ed. 1971); Gregory, Vicarious
Responsibility and Contributory Negligence, 41 YALE L.J. 831 (1932); Comment, Imputed
Contributory Negligence, 26 TENN. L. REV. 531 (1959).
2. Contributory negligence acted as a complete bar except when either the last clear chance
or the discovered peril doctrine applied. Sisti v. Thompson, 149 Tex. 189,229 S.W.2d 610 (1950).
This rule prevailed in Texas until Sept. 1, 1973, which was the effective date of the Texas
comparative negligence statute. See TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN art. 2212a (Vernon Supp.
1976-77).
3. See Comment, Imputed Contributory Negligence, 13 TEXAS L. REV. 161 (1935).
4. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 485, 486, 491 (1965) [hereinafter cited as
RESTATEMENT (SECOND)]. The reporter states:
The rule stated in this Section rejects, except as indicated by the reference to
other Sections, the doctrine of 'imputed contributory negligence,' under which
the plaintiff is barred from recovery against the defendant because the negligence
of a third person, with whom the plaintiff stands in some relation, has contributed
to the harm.
Id. § 485, comment a at 541. Sections 486 and 491 adopt the both-ways doctrine, the first relative
to master and servant and the second to joint enterprisers.
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importance primarily when a passenger is injured in a traffic accident
attributable to the negligence of his driver and another vehicle's driver. In
such a situation the relationship between the passenger and his driver may be
either that of master and servant or of joint enterprisers.' In both situations
the right of control which the passenger has over the driver has been regarded
as the basis for justifying the imposition of vicarious liability on the passenger. It should be noted that Texas narrowly limits findings of joint
enterprise
to cases in which the parties were on a joint business trip or
6
venture.

The both-ways doctrine has the merit of simplicity, but the disadvantage of
being simplistic. Typically, when the issue of vicarious liability is involved,
the controversy is between two innocent persons: the plaintiff who has been
injured by a negligent servant, and the defendant-master who is himself
innocent. Moreover, the negligent agent is often insolvent and, therefore,
unable to satisfy a judgment. Fairness and justice in dealing with accident
losses justify the imposition of liability upon the non-negligent employer or
other principal who is typically better able to bear such losses as a cost of
doing business.7
Imputed contributory negligence issues, however, are usually involved in a
suit by an innocent plaintiff against a negligent defendant. It is not a
controversy between two non-negligent parties as is true when vicarious
liability is at issue. Careful consideration of the justification for imposing
vicarious liability upon a master will demonstrate that these reasons do not
justify the imputation of a servant's contributory negligence to the plaintiffmaster. Thus, that the rules regarding vicarious liability require a both-ways
test with respect to imputed contributory negligence is a non sequitur. For
example, one of the major reasons for the vicarious liability rule is to allow a
plaintiff injured by a negligent, judgment-proof servant to obtain a judgment
against a person with a "deep pocket," the master. This policy consideration
is not met by imputing negligence to a faultless plaintiff who seeks a recovery
for injuries he received; in this situation there is no need to create a solvent
defendant. Minnesota has adopted this policy by discarding the both-ways
rule, at least as to automobile negligence cases, and thus, virtually eliminating
all vestiges of imputed contributory negligence in that state. This result is
commendable because seldom, if ever, is there any good reason for imputing
the negligence of another to a blameless plaintiff in a suit against a negligent
defendant.
This much has been said by way of support for the holding of the Texas
Supreme Court in Rollins Leasing Corp. v. Barkley.' Prior to this decision the
bailee's contributory negligence was imputed to his bailor to bar the bailor's
recovery in a suit against a negligent third person for damages to the bailment
5. See Satterfield v. Satterfield, 448 S.W.2d 456 (Tex. 1969); Bonney v. San Antonio
Transit Co., 160 Tex. 11,325 S.W.2d 117 (1959).
6. See Shoemaker v. Estate of Whistler, 513 S.W.2d 10 (Tex. 1974). The court held that
joint enterprises are limited to enterprises "having a business or pecuniary purpose." Id. at 17.
7. See W. PROSSER, supra note 1, § 69; Seavey, Speculations as to "RespondeatSuperior,"
1934 HARV. LEGAL ESSAYS 433.

8. See Weber v. Stokely-Van Camp, Inc., 274 Minn. 482, 144 N.W.2d 540 (1966). See also
Greyhound Lines, Inc. v. Caster, 216 A.2d 689 (Del. 1966).
9. 531 S.W.2d 603 (Tex. 1975).
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property. This doctrine was established in T. & P. Ry. v. Tankersley"0 which
was decided in 1885. In that case the plaintiff-bailor's cotton was destroyed
by fire as a consequence of the negligence of the bailee-warehouseman and
the defendant-railroad. In a suit by the bailor against the railroad it was held
that the negligence of the bailee-warehouseman would be imputed to the
bailor to bar recovery. In effect, this holding required the bailor to seek
recovery against the bailee with the bailee having no recourse against the

railroad for contribution.
In Barkley a bailor rented a truck to plaintiff-bailee who had an accident
with a negligent motorist. The bailor intervened in a personal injury action
brought by the bailee against the motorist to recover the loss of his truck.
Plaintiff-bailee was found to be contributorily negligent. Both the trial court

and the court of civil appeals properly denied recovery to the bailor on the
basis of past decisions imputing the negligence of the bailee to the bailor to bar
recovery. I

Quoting from Professor Prosser and from Chief Justice Alexander's dissenting opinion in Rose v. Baker, 12 the Texas Supreme Court abolished the
unique Texas rule imputing the negligence of the bailee to the bailor in this

situation. The court held that in the absence of some kind of control
relationship between the plaintiff and another who was negligent no contributory negligence may be imputed. Thus, there are no longer any rules in
Texas for the imputation of contributory negligence separate from those that
3

apply for the imposition of vicarious liability.'

II. OCCUPIERS OF LAND
The duty an occupier owes to a person injured on his land has historically
been determined by the relationship between the occupier and the injured
party.' 4 Those who came onto the premises of another are commonly divided
into three categories: trespassers, licensees, and invitees. 5 The courts in
10. 63 Tex. 57 (1885).
II. In addition to Tankersley, other cases which have imputed the negligence of the bailee to
the bailor are Rose v. Baker, 138 Tex. 554, 160 S.W.2d 515 (1942); Weir v. Petty, 355 S.W.2d 192
(Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1962, writ ref'd); Langford Motor Co. v. McClung Constr. Co., 46
S.W.2d 388 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1932, writ ref'd).
12. 138 Tex. 554, 558, 160 S.W.2d 515, 517 (1942).
13. This decision leaves unaffected the rules pertaining to the rights of an injured spouse to
recover from a third person for expenses and lost earnings as a consequence of an injury
attributable to the negligence of the other spouse and the third person. Under our community
property system the cause of action is jointly owned; negligence of the non-injured spouse
therefore bars or diminishes recovery on the cause of action that is jointly owned. This is not,
however, really a principle of imputed contributory negligence, and, therefore, is unaffected by
Barkley.
14. See Rosas v. Buddie's Food Store, 518 S.W.2d 534 (Tex. 1975).
15. See Thacker v. J.C. Penney Co., 254 F.2d 672, 676 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 820
(1958); Arambula v. J.M. Dellinger, Inc., 415 S.W.2d 456 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1967,
writ ref'd n.r.e.). Courts have also held that the liability for injuries to children caused by natural
conditions is governed by the usual rules relating to the three categories. See Gowen v.
Willenborg, 366 S.W.2d 695 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston 1963, writ ref'd n.r.e.). Yet it is clear that
policy considerations dictate that children be treated differently and thus be classed separately.
See W. PROSSER, supra note I, § 59. An occupier only has a duty not to injure a trespasser by
willful or wanton conduct, or through gross negligence. See Burton Constr. & Shipbldg. Co. v.
Broussard, 273 S.W.2d 598 (Tex. 1955); Hopkins v. Texas Power & Light Co., 514 S.W.2d 143
(Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1974, no writ); Garner v. Harris County Houston Ship Channel
Navigation Dist., 69 S.W.2d 425 (Tex. Civ. App.-Galveston 1934, no writ).
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Texas and in the majority of states adhere to these commonlaw classifications
and hold that mere negligence is an insufficient foundation upon which to
impose liability upon the occupier. Notwithstanding, at least two states have
abandoned the above classifications and instead have held that an occupier's
duty is governed by ordinary negligence concepts.16
Although the liability of an occupier for injuries suffered by trespassers 7
and invitees18 has remained substantially unchanged for many years, liability
with respect to licensees has not been so stable. Some prior Texas decisions
have implied that gross negligence or recklessness is always a prerequisite to
recovery by a licensee. Hence, a finding of mere negligence would not be
sufficient.' 9 This is a much more restrictive view of an occupier's duty than
that commonly adopted in most states, and certainly more
restrictive than the
20
duty prescribed by the Restatement (Second) of Torts.
The Restatement (Second) imposes liability upon an occupier for injuries
sustained by a licensee in two instances. First, any negligence pertaining to
the way an activity is carried out on the premises subjects the occupier to
liability. 2' Second, negligence in maintaining a dangerous condition known to
the occupier or of which the occupier has reason to know, with some
qualifications, will subject the occupier to liability. 22 It is insufficient to show
merely that the occupier should, in the exercise of ordinary care, have known
or had reason to know of the danger. Rather, to be held liable, the occupier
must have known of or have had reason to know of the danger. Reason to
know of the danger means that he had sufficient knowledge to put him on
notice that the danger probably existed.23 Some courts, however, always
24
require actual knowledge of the danger.
In addition to the exception with regard to the occupier's knowledge of the
dangerous conditions, the Restatement (Second) and the majority of courts
have accepted the idea that a licensee who has the same knowledge and
appreciation of the danger as the occupier cannot recover. 25 Thus, if the
danger was as obvious to the licensee as it was to the occupier, or if the
occupier gave the kind of warning that provided the licensee with an awareness of the danger, there would be no liability. 2 6 This is a partial acceptance of
16. See Rowland v. Christian, 69 Cal. 2d 108,443 P.2d 561,70 Cal. Rptr. 97 (1968); Richard v.
City of Honolulu, 51 Hawaii 134, 452 P.2d 445 (1969).
17. See State v. Tennison, 509 S.W.2d 560-(Tex. 1974).
18. An occupier has a duty to an invitee of reasonable care in maintaining the premises,
discovering defects, and in making the premises safe or giving adequate warning. See Adam
Dante Corp. v. Sharpe, 483 S.W.2d 452 (Tex. 1972); Stamford Oil Mill Co. v. Barnes, 103 Tex.
409, 128 S.W.375 (1910); Safeway Stores, Inc. v. Leck, 543 S.W.2d 207 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco
1976, no writ).
19. See Renfro Drug Co. v. Lewis, 149 Tex. 507, 235 S.W.2d 609 (1950); Carlisle v.
Weingarten, Inc., 137 Tex. 220, 152 S.W.2d 1073 (1941). See also Keeton, Torts, AnnualSurvey
of Texas Law, 24 Sw. L.J. 237 (1970).
20. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND), supra note 3, §§ 341-342.
21. Id. § 341. See also W. PROSSER, supra note 1, § 60.
22. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND), supra note 3, § 342.
23. Id. §§ 342 and 339, comment g.
24. See State v. Tennison, 509 S.W.2d 560 (Tex. 1974).
25. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND), supra note 3, § 342; See, e.g.,
Mississippi Power & Light
Co. v. Griffin, 81 F.2d 292 (5th Cir, 1936); Kopp v. R.S. Noonan, Inc., 385 Pa. 460, 123 A.2d 429
(1956); State v. Tennison, 509 S.W.2d 560 (Tex. 1974).
26. An occupier owes no duty to an invitee who is aware of the danger. See MassmanJohnson v. Gundolf, 484 S.W.2d 555 (Tex. 1972).
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the assumed risk doctrine, but it is a far cry from a general defense of assumed
risk. This was discussed last year in the Annual Survey of Texas Law in
commenting on Farley v. MM Cattle Co. ,27 and it was there said that "[m]ost
courts hold that an occupier of land can satisfy any duty of care owed to a
licensee by giving notice of dangers that would not likely be noticed by the
casual observer."E" One notion behind this rule is that even though a jury
might be justified in finding that a reasonable person would have eliminated
the danger and that the occupier was negligent and could be held liable to an
invitee, such liability should not extend to one, such as a licensee, who was
simply tolerated on the premises.
The Texas Supreme Court decision in Lower Neches Valley Authority v.
Murphy29 clarifies the Texas law concerning the duty owed to licensees by
occupiers of land. In that case a fourteen-year-old boy, an adult as regards
this problem, sustained injuries when he dived into a tank maintained by the
river authority, a governmental agency, and struck his head on a mound of
clay at the bottom of the canal. Even if the plaintiff was not the kind of
intruder normally classified as a licensee upon the premises of an individual,
he would nevertheless have been so regarded under the Texas Tort Claims
Act.30 The existence of mounds at the bottom of the tank was known to both
the defendant-occupier and the plaintiff-licensee, but the precise location of
the particular mounds was not known to either the defendant or the plaintiff.
The contention was made that because the plaintiff did not know of the
existence of a mound at the exact spot at which he dived, the occupier should
be liable if found to be negligent. The trial court granted summary judgment
for the defendant, but the court of civil appeals reversed. The Texas Supreme
Court reversed the court of civil appeals and upheld the action of the trial
court. The supreme court thus reached the result that would have been
reached in most jurisdictions since the plaintiff had as much knowledge of the
danger as did the occupier. The court did, however, recognize that an
occupier would be liable to a licensee for injuries sustained as a result of the
occupier's willful or wanton conduct, or his gross negligence.

III.

DEFAMATION

Public defamatory communications by the mass media have historically
been made at the risk of the enterprise and its publisher. 31 The law on this
subject, however, has been drastically altered as a result of decisions holding
that the first amendment requires toleration of some falsehood in order that
more material speech may be protected. 32 Though significant attempts at
27. 529 S.W.2d 751 (Tex. 1975).
28. Keeton, Torts, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 30 Sw. L.J. 2, 5 n.21 (1976).
29. 536 S.W.2d 561 (Tex. 1976).
30. "As to premise defects, the unit of government shall owe to any claimant only the duty
owed by private persons to a licensee on private property, unless payment has been made by the
claimant for the use of the premises." TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 6252-19, § 18(b) (Vernon
1970).
31. See RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 598, comment bat 259 (1938); Keeton, Defamation and
Freedom of the Press, 54 TEXAS L. REV. 1221 (1976). For an analysis of the privileges of fair
comment on public interest matters see W. PROSSER, supra note l, at 776-96; Veeder, Freedom of
Public Discussion, 23 HARV. L. REV. 413, 422-31 (1910).

32.

Until 1964 the first amendment lay dormant as a defense to defamation. With the
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defining defamation have been undertaken, the specific scope and consequences of the constitutional defense in defamation cases have not been
33
determined.
A.

The Fault Requirement

As enunciated above, the limits of the first amendment's impact on the
liability of media for defamatory publications are indefinite. Nevertheless,
4
several fundamental propositions bear repeating :
(1) The press and the electronic media have a constitutional privilege
to publish false and defamatory matter including misstatements of
defamatory fact about others 5 The common-law rule subjecting the

media to liability except when there was proof of truth of all injurious
statements does not afford adequate protection to first amendment
liberties ;36

(2) The constitutional privilege enjoyed by the press and the broadcasting media requires a differentiation between private individuals
37 on

the one hand and public officials and public figures on the other;
(3) Precise content has not as yet been given to the terms 'public
officials' and 'public figures.' 38 The category of public officials, how-

ever, includes not only those who are commonly classified as public
officers but also public employees who exercise any substantial governlandmark decision of New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254(1964), new life was breathed
into the controversy surrounding individual freedoms. The Court in New York Times held
narrowly that under the Constitution colloquium had not been proven and that a qualified
privilege, assertable in the absence of "actual malice," could be based on a reasonable,
good-faith belief that the underlying facts of the defamation were true. (For the Court, "actual
malice" is a phrase of art, dealing only with knowing-or-reckless falsity rather than with ill-will.
For a distinction drawn between actual malice and common law malice see Cantrell v. Forest City
Publishing Co., 419 U.S. 245 (1976).) The implication of New York Times was momentous: The
closer a statement comes to criticism of the government (seditious libel), the more protection is
afforded by the first amendment. The policy reason was persuasive: In order to encourage debate
of public issues, and even of the performance of public officials, the press should be shielded
from self-censorship.
For other cases instrumental in the evolution of the constitutional defense see Time, Inc. v.
Firestone, 96S. Ct. 958,47 L. Ed. 2d 154 (1976); Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323(1974);
Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29 (1971); Greenbelt Coop. Publishing Ass'n v.
Bresler, 398 U.S. 6 (1970); St. Amant v. Thompson, 390 U.S. 727 (1968); Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383
U.S. 75 (1966).
33. See generally Keeton, supra note 31; Robertson, Defamationand the FirstAmendment:
In Praise of Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 54 TEXAS L. REV. 199 (1976).
34. The textual material which follows is taken from Keeton, supra note 31, at 1227-28
(original footnotes omitted).
35. A controversial issue exists as to whether the first amendment protection extends to
defendants other than the media. Under the prevailing view, the privilege is limited to the media.
Decisions involving defamation by non-media defendants have concentrated upon the common
law truth privilege without adverting to Gertz or any other of the New York Times opinions. For a
consideration of the conceivable justifications for expanding the actual-malice protection to
statements made by citizens or for restricting it to the media see Robertson, supra note 33, at
215-20.
36. See New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279 (1964).
37. See Time, Inc. v. Firestone, 96 S. Ct. 958, 965, 47 L. Ed. 2d 154, 162 (1976); Gertz v.
Robert Welch, Inc. 418 U.S. 323, 343 (1974).
38. In Herald-Post Publishing Co. v. Hervey, 282 S.W.2d 410,413 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso
1955, writ ref'd n.r.e.), Texas early recognized a difference between public officials and private
citizens: "We wish first to point out that publications about public officials are treated differently
than publications about private individuals." See also Fitzjarrald v. Panhandle Publishing Co.,
149 Tex. 87, 228 S.W.2d 499 (1950).
The federal distinction was slower in coming, but in Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U.S. 75 (1966),
significant inroads were made with respect to the narrow seditious libel holding in New York
Times. The extension of the public official rule, subject to the qualified privilege of fair comment
in the absence of knowing-or-reckless falsity, to public figures occurred in Curtis Publishing Co.
v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 164 (1967).
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mental power.3 9 The category of public figures is not definitionally
applied to those who are simply famous or well known [sic], but rather to
those who have achieved some prominence and, therefore, influence
over others in the resolution of public questions ;40
(4) The constitutional privilege requires that a public official or a
public figure establish clearly and convincingly that the defamatory
falsehood was published with knowledge of its falsity or with reckless
disregard for the truth, if the defamatory matter relates to
aspects of the
41
person's life that stimulate a legitimate public interest;
(5) The constitutional privilege requires that the private person, or
the person who is neither a public official nor a private citizen, prove that
defamatory matter was published either
42 with knowledge of its falsity or
without a reasonable basis for belief;
(6) The Constitution does not permit recovery of presumed or punitive damages against the press or broadcasting media unless the plaintiff
establishes clearly and convincingly that the media had knowledge of the
falsity or acted in reckless disregard of the truth of the defamatory matter
published.4 3 As the Court has stated, 'In short, the private defamation
plaintiff who establishes liability under a less demanding standard than
that stated by New York Times may recover only such damages as are
sufficient to compensate him for actual injury.'"
In their development of a new doctrinal structure for defamation, the states
have had to cope with extant and malleable constitutional demands. The
resultant framework is interstitial. First, the press and other mass media may
no longer be held liable, irrespective of the truth or falsity of the published
material, without proof of respective fault.45 Secondly, the states, on behalf
of the defamed plaintiff, are free to adopt as antecedents to 46recovery more
stringent requirements than constitutional notions mandate.
State courts, however, have not been inclined to formulate criteria more
compelling than those announced in the federal opinions . 47 Instead, the trend
of state court decisions is toward giving the defamed plaintiff as much
39. Mr. Justice Brennan, writing for the majority in Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U.S. 75, 85
(1966), concluded "that the 'public official' designation applies at the very least to those among
the hierarchy of government employees who have, or appear to the public to have, substantial
responsibility for or control over the conduct of governmental affairs." See also Gertz v. Robert
Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 n.6 (1974); New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 373 U.S. 254, 283 n.23

(1964).
40. See Time, Inc. v. Firestone, 96 S. Ct. 958, 47 L. Ed. 2d 154 (1976). In Firestone the wife
of the wealthy industrialist, Russell Firestone, was not found to be a public figure, even though
she had actively discussed at press conferences the events central to the divorce proceedings. As
a consequence, proof of actual malice was not a prerequisite to her recovery against Time in a
subsequent defamation action. Id. at 964-66, 47 L. Ed. 2d at 163. But see Gertz v. Robert Welch,
Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974), in which the Court adhered specifically to its evolved public-official,
public-figure analysis and gave no hint of Firestone's "public controversy" approach.
41. See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 342 (1974); New York Times Co. v.
Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279-80 (1964).
42. See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 347 n. 10(1974). See also note 32 supra.
43. See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 349-50 (1974).
44. Id. at 350.
45. See notes 32, 35-44 supra and accompanying text.
46. In this constitutional defense area the standards imposed by the Court have been
minimums below which a plaintiff may not go in making his proof and still survive a directed
verdict. For example, the plaintiff who seeks punitive damages must clearly and convincingly
show that the media had knowledge of the falsity or acted in reckless disregard of the truth of the
defamatory matter published. See note 43 supra and accompanying text.
47. See, e.g., Cahill v. Hawaiian Paradise Park Corp., 56 Hawaii 522,543 P.2d 1356 (1975);
Troman v. Wood, 62 Ill. 2d 154, 340 N.E.2d 292 (1975); Gobin v. Globe Publishing Co., 216 Kan.
223, 531 P.2d 76 (1975). Contra, Walker v. Colorado Springs Sun, Inc., 538 P.2d 450 (Colo.), cert.
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protection as possible against the mass media. 48 Conformity with this trend
was demonstrated by the Texas Supreme Court in Foster v. Laredo Newspaper,Inc.49 The defendant-newspaper published an allegedly libelous article
suggesting the plaintiff was responsible for a certain flooding in the city."
Plaintiff, a private civil engineer who had been employed by the county on
separate occasions for special projects, served as the elected Webb County
surveyor. The court, in reversing the court of appeals, concluded after a
bifurcated analysis, that a factual issue had been raised. 51 First, the supreme
court ruled that, although the plaintiff was a "public official" in connection
with his elective office, the New York Times requirement that actual malice
be proved was not applicable to him as a public official because the statements made about him did not clearly relate to his official conduct as county
surveyor.5 2 Also preliminary to the court's final holding that plaintiff was a
private individual and could recover damages under a theory of negligent
defamation 53 was a determination that the county surveyor was not a "public
figure." The court accomplished this by concluding as a matter of law that the
evidence was insufficient to indicate that plaintiff had either thrust himself
into the "vortex of the controversy" or had achieved pervasive fame or
54
notoriety in the community.
The precise holding of Foster represents only a restatement of the law as
found in Time, Inc. v. Firestone.55 The significance of Foster centers on its
factual inferences: a county surveyor, even though elected, is not the kind of
public official contemplated in New York Times or in Gertz. The plain import
of this is that only those governmental officials and employees who exercise
uniquely governmental functions, albeit minor in character, are burdened
denied, 423 U.S. 1025 (1975). Chapadeau v. Utica Observer-Dispatch, Inc., 38 N.Y.2d 196,341
N.E.2d 569, 379 N.Y.S.2d 61 (1976).
48. See authorities cited in note 47 supra.
49. 541 S.W.2d 809 (Tex. 1976).
50. In documenting the events giving rise to the litigation, the court wrote:
On June 17, 1973 an article printed in the Laredo Times newspaper in connection
with the flooding problem made the following references to Foster:
The Rice development official said the flooded area in question was platted
by Jack Foster, who doubles as a consultant engineer for Webb County.
Foster has been handling numerous engineering jobs for the Commissioners
Court on a consultant basis involving road improvements, some paving,
park recreational work and drainage problems in Del Mar Hills.
Id. at 810-11.
51. Id. at 816-17.
52. Id. at 813-14.
53. Id. at 819. The standard of care owed to a private citizen, i.e., an individual who is
neither a public official nor a public figure, is a lesser measure: While a public personality must
prove knowing or reckless falsity, the private individual need only demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant medium knew or should have known that the statement
was false. See Time, Inc. v. Firestone, 96 S. Ct. 958, 47 L. Ed. 2d 154 (1976); Gertz v. Robert
Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974); New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
54. 541 S.W.2d at 817. The two tests for determining public figure status were announced in
Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 352 (1974): "general fame or notoriety in the
community," or having voluntarily "thrust himself into the vortex of [the] public issue." But see
Time, Inc. v. Firestone, 96S. Ct. 958,965,47 L. Ed. 2d 154, 163-64 (1976), in which the Court, per
Mr. Justice Rehnquist, hinted that the phrase of art "public figure" will not be definitionally
applied to those who are simply famous or notorious; rather, it will apply only to those who have
achieved prominence in the resolution of public issues generally, or in the resolution of particular
issues related to the subject matter of the publication.

55. 96 S. Ct. 958. 47 L. Ed. 2d 154 (1976).
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56
with the actual malice requirement set forth in New York Times.
The position taken by the supreme court was not, however, the inevitable
consequence of the federal decisions. 7 Practical alternatives exist. A state
supreme court could develop the state common law to accommodate defamatory statements which would not otherwise come within the categories
of communications requiring proof by the plaintiff of actual malice. For
example, an elected county surveyor, who meets neither the "public official"
nor "public figure" criteria, may, nonetheless, be so adjudicated to have
attained public-personality status as a matter of state law. The adoption by a
state of a less exacting standard in order to invoke for the media's protection
the public-official, public-figure actual malice burden may be considered
more feasible or desirable than attempting to decide the hard questions that
would sometimes be necessary if bare conformity to constitutional demands
for freedom of the press were the measure. Moreover, states might settle
upon a categorical rule that all elected officials, irrespective of their having
taken the oath of office 58 or having control over the conduct of public
affairs,5 9 must prove actual malice in order to survive summary judgment for
the defendant-medium. The effect of such a rule would be the elimination of
the necessity for drawing difficult distinctions in at least the elected official
classification, based on the exercise of a uniquely governmental function.'

B. The Statute of Limitations
Many of the rules and principles limiting the liability of those engaged in
various socially desirable activities have been modified, eliminated, or altered in such a way as to shift more losses from those victimized by these
activities to those engaged therein. 6' The extent to which courts will be
allowed to go without causing serious social consequences and seeding
constitutional conflict among the three governmental branches remains to be
seen. One area of the law which has received the judiciary's recent attention
is that of limitations.
The opportunity for judicial at-law enhancement of the rights of recovery
lies not with the legislatively determined duration of the period during which
an action may be brought, but with the fixing of the points at which the period
56. See note 32 supra. Specifically unfortunate for Foster was the supreme court's having
discounted any argument that the newspaper's defamatory statements imputed incompetence or

dishonesty in relation to plaintiff's work as county surveyor. The inference to be drawn from this
would seem to make plaintiff's qualifications for continuing in his official capacity a matter of
public interest.
57. See note 46 supra and accompanying text, in which it was asserted that the series of
federal cases dating from New York Times documents simply an amalgamation of minimum
standards.
58. Texas cases which have indicated that the requirement of oath taking is a determinative

factor in distinguishing between public officials and public employees include: Lightfoot v. Lane,
104 Tex. 447, 140 S.W. 89 (1911); Commissioners' Court v. Garrett, 236 S.W. 970 (Tex. Comm'n
App. 1922, jdgmt adopted); Loard v. Como, 137 S.W.2d 880 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1940,

writ ref'd).
59. See note 39 supra.
60. See Keeton, supra note 31, at 1235, where it was noted that simplification of the
doctrinal structure of defamation in achieving the proper balance for adequately protecting both
reputational interests and free speech might best be accomplished by requiring all elected public
officials in Texas, regardless of the nature of the defamation, to prove actual malice in order to

recover in a defamation action against a mass-media defendant.
61.

See W.

PROSSER,

supra note 1, at 1-7.
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begins to run or is tolled. The statute of limitations commonly begins to run
when the cause of action accrues, 62 and it has normally been held that the
cause of action accrues at the time harm results from the tortious act. 63 The

two objectives of imposing limitations of time on the prosecution of causes of
action are the avoidance of stale and often unmeritorious claims 64 and the
provision for parties' repose. 65 For apparently equitable and notice reasons,

courts have evinced a tendency toward abandoning the rule that would start
limitations running from the time of harm in favor of some kind of discovery
rule.66 The practical effect of embracing such a rule is to toll the running of the

applicable statute of limitation 67 for five to fifteen years after the tortious act
was committed, making it costly and almost impossible through normal
discovery procedures to gather the relevant evidence to the extent possible
shortly after the incident occurred. But such an analysis misses the point;
comparison of discovery ten or fifteen years down the road with that
obtainable the day or month after the tortious act presumes that the injured
party has recognized that a cause of action has accrued. It is precisely this

injustice, the barring of a cause of action even before its existence is
discerned, that the discovery rule is designed to circumvent. Any argument
against the discovery rule should not focus upon prompt assimilation of

relevant evidence; rather, the real insufficiency of the rule is that it leaves
unresolved the issue concerning the legal moment that a cause of action
becomes evident, or is imputed to be evident, to the potential plaintiff.

In Kelley v. Rinkle68 suit was brought one year and thirteen days after

defendant-doctor had turned over to a credit agency records of plaintiff's
allegedly delinquent account. 69 Since the case had been appealed from a

summary judgment, the fact that plaintiff had no actual notice of the report's
existence until some five months after the doctor had filed it with the credit
bureau 70 was presumed true. Dating from the time of actual notice, the
litigation was commenced within the one-year limitations period. The Su62. See Martel v. Somers, 26Tex. 551,561 (1863); Beirne & Burnside v. Kelsey, 21 Tex. 190,
191 (1858). See generally 37 TEX. JUR. 2D Limitation of Actions § 56 (1962).
63. See authorities cited at note 62 supra.
64. When the act causing the damage to another is originally lawful, the cause of action does
not accrue until the injury occurs. When the act is originally unlawful, however, the cause of
action accrues at the time of the act. See Axcell v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., 387 F. Supp. 364
(S.D. Tex. 1974); Tennessee Gas Transmission Co. v. Fromme, 153 Tex. 352, 269 S.W.2d 336
(1954).
65. See, e.g., McAdams v. Dallas Ry. & Terminal Co., 149 Tex. 217,229 S.W.2d 1012 (1950);
Sherman v. Sipper, 137 Tex. 85, 152 S.W.2d 319 (1941).
66. See, e.g., Boyd v. Knox, 273 S.W.2d 81 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1954, no writ);
Lewis v. Hall, 271 S.W.2d 447 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1954, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
67. See, e.g., Moonie v. Lynch, 256 Cal. App. 2d 361,64 Cal. Rptr. 55 (1967) (negligence of
accountant); Basque v. Yuk Lin Liau, 50 Hawaii 397, 441 P.2d 636 (1969) (negligence of
neighboring landowners); Flanagan v. Mount Eden Gen. Hosp., 24 N.Y.2d 427, 248 N.E.2d 871,
301 N.Y.S.2d 23 (1969) (medical malpractice). See generally 37 TEX. JUR. 2D Limitations of
Actions § 62 (1962).
68. 532 S.W.2d 947 (Tex. 1976), noted in 30 Sw. L.J. 950 (1976).
69. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 5524, § I (Vernon 1958) provides: "There shall be
commenced and prosecuted within one year after the cause of action shall have accrued, and not
afterward, all actions or suits of the following description: I. Actions for malicious prosecution or
for injuries done to the character or reputation of another by libel or slander."
70. Plaintiff filed his complaint on March 26, 1974; the doctor had submitted to the Credit
Bureau Services, Inc., on March 13, 1973, a "voluntary report" that plaintiff owed $277.00 on an
account. Not until August 29, 1973, when he visited the credit bureau to learn the reasons for his
recently poor credit rating, did plaintiff learn of the defendant's report. 532 S.W.2d at 947-48.

1977]

TORTS

preme Court of Texas, expressly adopting the discovery rule, held that the
period of limitations for causes of action for libel of one's credit reputation by
the publication of a defamatory report to a credit agency begins to run when
diligence should have learned
the person defamed learns of, or by reasonable
7
of, the existence of the credit report. '
Aside from the policy reasons outlined above, a partial influence upon the
outcome was the position previously taken in some recent Texas medical
malpractice cases which adopted the discovery rule.7 2 The vitality of the
judiciary's social policy-making was abbreviated, however, since the legislature at the last regular session abrogated the discovery rule for medical
malpractice and substituted a flat two-year period from the time of injury. 73A
similar fate may await the application of the discovery rule in defamation
cases. Furthermore, a study commission has recommended another solution
for medical malpractice that could be utilized as a legislative solution in other
tort areas. 74 The solution is to provide a relatively short period after discovery
with a provision for barring recovery after a substantial period has lapsed,
running from the date of injury. The specific recommendation is this: A
claimant must bring the suit within one year from the date that the claimant
may
discovered, or should have discovered, the injury; in no event, however,
75
the suit be brought more than three years after the injury occurred.
IV.

MEDICAL MALPRACTICE

Approximately eighty percent of the medical mishaps that produce malpractice claims occur in hospitals. 76 Under our existing fault-liability insurance system, physicians and hospitals are independently responsible for
those mishaps that are produced through negligence. This hospital-physician
dichotomy has created problems of accountability throughout hospitalization
since no single person or entity is responsible for the total care of a patient.
This is reflected in the large number of malpractice cases involving multiple
defendants. The hospital is generally not liable for the negligence of the staff
physicians.7 7 Conversely, physicians are generally not liable for negligent
78
care rendered by hospital personnel.
Medical risk-control can be facilitated by making the health care institution
solely responsible for the negligence of everyone, including physicians,
71. Id. at 949.
72. See Hays v. Hall, 488 S.W.2d 412 (Tex. 1972) (cause of action for malpractice arising
from negligence in vasectomy operation accrued at time of discovery of true facts concerning
failure of operation, or on date it should have been discovered by exercise of ordinary care and
diligence); Gaddis v. Smith, 417 S.W.2d 577 (Tex. 1967) (cause of action for malpractice based on
negligence of surgeon in failing to remove surgical sponge from body of patient accrued at time
patient discovered such sponge).
73. See TEX. INS. CODE ANN. art. 5.82, § 4 (Vernon Pamphlet Supp. 1975-76). See also
Keeton, supra note 28, at 12.
74. See FINAL REPORT OFTHE TEXAS MEDICAL PROFESSIONAL LIABILITY STUDY COMMISSION

(Dec. 1976).
75. See id. at 11.
76. See I NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF INSURANCE COMMISSIONERS, CLOSED CLAIMS STUDY,
No. 2, at 10-12 (April 1976).
77. In Ferguson v. Gonyaw, 64 Mich. App. 685, 236 N.W.2d 543 (1975), the court held that a
hospital could not be held liable solely on the basis of negligence of one of its staff surgeons.
78. In McEachern v. Glenview Hosp., Inc., 505 S.W.2d 386 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth
1974, no writ), it was held that the hospital alone could be found liable for failing to have an
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attendant with the patient in the emergency room.
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engaged in health care services within the confines of the institution.7 9 Given
the questionable effectiveness of the individual efforts of physicians in
reducing their risk, and the knowledge that most claims arise from hospitalbased incidents, efforts to reduce the number of adverse medical events and
the exposure to liability may be more effective if focused upon the medical

institution rather than upon the individual.
This much has been said in support of a recent Texas Supreme Court
holding which clarifies the law limiting the surgeon's liability and extending
that of the hospital. In Spargerv. Worley Hospital,Inc. 80 plaintiff named as
defendants the doctor who had performed the operation and the hospital at
which the surgery had been conducted. This malpractice action was brought

as a result of the failure to remove a sponge from the plaintiff's abdomen at
the conclusion of the operation. The jury found that the nurses assisting the
doctor were negligent, but no negligence was attributed to the doctor.

Reversing the trial court, the court of civil appeals held the doctor was
vicariously liable for the nurses' negligence.
On appeal to the supreme court the issue raised was the degree to which the
physician was accountable for the negligence of the hospital nurses assisting
him in the operating room. Theoretically, if the nurse is an employee of the
physician, then liability can be imposed on the physician via respondeat
superior. Typically, nurses are in the hospital's employ, not the doctor's.
Notwithstanding, nurses may be the doctor's servants through two alternative theories:8 ' Liability may be imposed on a doctor for the negligence of a

nurse by either the borrowed-servant 82 or the captain-of-the-ship doctrine.83
Application of these theories in Texas was discussed in Sparger. The jury
found that the nurses were not the borrowed servants of the surgeon;
essentially, the jury determined that the nurses were not "subject to the right
of the physician to direct or control the details of the particular work .... "84
Under the borrowed-servant doctrine only the master-hospital is liable for the
79. See FINAL REPORT OF THE TEXAS MEDICAL PROFESSIONAL LIABILITY STUDY COMMISSION
TO THE 65TH LEGISLATURE 46-47 (Dec. 1976).

80. 20 Tex. Sup. Ct. J.143 (Jan. 12, 1977). In addition to Sparger,the Texas Supreme Court
decided Ramon v. Mani, 20 Tex. Sup. Ct. J.149 (Jan. 12, 1977). Since the facts and holdings of the
two cases are virtually identical, discussion in the text will be limited to Sparger.
81. See Comment, Separation of Responsibility in the Operating Room: The Borrowed
Servant, the Captain of the Ship, andthe Scope of Surgeons' VicariousLiability, 49 NOTRE DAME
LAW. 933 (1974).
82. Texas has for several years adhered to the principle that one employer's employee could
become the borrowed servant of another. See J.A. Robinson Sons v. Wigart, 431 S.W.2d 327
(Tex. 1968); Producers Chem. Co. v. McKay, 366 S.W.2d 220 (Tex. 1963). The critical issue
under the borrowed-servant analysis is whether the master (the surgeon) had the right to control
another's servants (the nurses employed by the hospital). Special attention should be given to
situations in which the employed person is independently engaged. See Leidy, Salesmen as
Independent Contractors, 28 MICH. L. REv. 365, 378 (1930).
As to the specific facts in Sparger, the court rejected the argument that the doctor had the right
of control necessary to subject him to liability as a matter of law under the borrowed-servant
doctrine; rather, the issue of whether or not the nurses were the borrowed servants of the doctor
was for the jury, and the jury had found for the surgeon. See 20 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. at 144.
83. The "captain of the ship" doctrine was initially propounded in McConnell v. Williams,
361 Pa. 355,65 A.2d 243(1959). Its utility in tort law is limited since even the court which created it
refused to apply it for the purposes of imposing liability on the defendant surgeon. The analogy,
however, is drawn from maritime law. The captain of the ship is said to be in total command and is
charged with full responsibility for the care and efficiency of the vessel and for the crew's
welfare. See Comment, supra note 81, at 935.
84. 20 Tex. Sup. Ct. J.at 144 (emphasis added).
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negligence of the nurses. The court may, nevertheless, have concluded that
the doctor was responsible under the captain-of-the-ship doctrine. The degree
to which this theory extends liability is unclear. In its narrowest application it
is co-extensive with the borrowed-servant doctrine or other master-servant
principles.8 5 Under its broadest interpretation the doctor would be liable for
the negligence of those in his presence, just as a captain is responsible for
those on his ship.
The Supreme Court of Texas apparently anticipated this expansive interpretation of the captain-of-the-ship doctrine. The court in Spargerrejected
the suggestion that the "surgeon's mere presence in the operating room6
makes him liable as a matter of law for the negligence of other persons."
Moreover, the supreme court explicitly discounted the idea that the captainof-the-ship doctrine should have a meaning separate from the borrowedservant doctrine, which cuts across the entire law of master and servant. The
mere fact that a surgeon is generally in control of the sequence of events in the
operating room does not subject him to vicarious liability for the negligence of
nurses, unless under all the other circumstances the commonly accepted rules
applicable to the borrowed-servant doctrine dictate such a result.8 7 From a
policy standpoint the borrowed-servant doctrine was originally needed in the
medical malpractice area since the law regarding charitable and governmental
immunities was such as to provide the great majority of hospitals with an
almost insurmountable defense.88 As a result of these immunities the injured
patient would not have had legal recourse against a solvent defendant unless
the physician or surgeon were held responsible pursuant to the borrowedservant doctrine. Today, however, both charitable and governmentally operated hospitals are subject to liability for the torts of employees.8 9 The
borrowed-servant doctrine should thus be abrogated in the medical malpractice area as regards the negligence of nurses at the hospital. Its abandonment
would be in the interest of centralizing responsibility, obtaining better quality
controls, and lessening the totality of insurance costs. The risk of liability
resulting from the negligence of nurses ought not be included as part of the
costs of both the doctor's insurance and that of the hospital. The single risk,
that of nurses' negligence, should fall on one or the other.
The position taken by the supreme court in Spargerand Ramon constitutes
a step in the right direction by casting the entire legal responsibility on the
hospital for the negligence of the employed nurses so long as they are acting in
furtherance of the hospital's business. Under the court's analysis, however,
the issue of whether the borrowed-servant doctrine applies is a question of
fact for the jury, 90 and is, thus, one that must be litigated at the request of
either the injured patient or the hospital. To avoid this case-by-case factual
85. See Thomas v. Hutchinson, 442 Pa. 118, 275 A.2d 23 (1971); McConnell v. Williams, 361
Pa. 355, 65 A.2d 243 (1959).
86. 20 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. at 145.

87. See note 82 supra.

88. See W. PROSSER, supra note 1, at 975-77, 992-96.
89. See Howle v. Camp Amon Carter, 470 S.W.2d 629 (Tex. 1971). But see Childs v.
Greenville Hosp. Auth., 479 S.W.2d 399 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1972, writ ref'd n.r.e.). See
also W. PROSSER, supra note 1, at 984, 996.
90. 20 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. at 144-45.
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contest, the Texas Supreme Court should at its first opportunity re-examine
the borrowed-servant doctrine with respect to its suitability for medical
malpractice in light of the medical malpractice crisis and the destruction of the
immunities that hospitals once enjoyed.

